Those principles are considered throughout the following steps in this cheat sheet. Before starting the threat modeling process it is important to identify business objectives of the applications you are assessing, and to identify security and compliance requirements that may be necessary due to business or government regulation. Having these objectives and requirements in mind before the threat assessment begins will help you to evaluate the impact of any threat you find during the risk analysis process.
Early in the threat modeling process, you will need to draw a data flow diagram of the entire system that is being assessed, including its trust boundaries. Thus, understanding the design of the application is key to performing threat modeling. Even if you are very familiar with the application design, you may identify additional data flows and trust boundaries throughout the threat modeling process.
A thorough understanding of how the system is designed will also help you assess the likelihood and potential impact of any particular threat that you identify.
When you are assessing an existing system that has existing design documentation, spend time reviewing that documentation. The documentation may be out of date, requiring you to gather new information to update the documentation. Or, there may be not documentation at all, requiring you to create the design documents. In the optimal case, you are performing your assessment during the design phase of the project, and the design documentation will be up-to-date and available.
In any event, this cheat sheet outlines steps you can take to create design documents if they are needed. Area : Software components: describes the layers and subsystems of the application. Area : Non-functional requirements: describes the design's concurrency and synchronization aspects. Area : Topology: describes the mapping of the software onto the hardware and shows the system's distributed aspects.
Gain an understanding of how the system works to perform a threat model, it is important to understand how the system works and interacts with its ecosystem. To start with creating a high-level information flow diagram, like the following:. Assets involved in the information flow should be defined and evaluated according to their value of confidentiality, integrity and availability. While data at rest is sometimes considered to be less vulnerable than data in transit, attackers often find data at rest a more valuable target than data in motion.
The risk profile for data in transit or data at rest depends on the security measures that are in place to secure data in either state. Protecting sensitive data both in transit and at rest is imperative for modern enterprises as attackers find increasingly innovative ways to compromise systems and steal data.
It is important to whiteboard system architecture by showing the major constraints and decisions in order to frame and start conversations. The value is actually twofold. If the architecture cannot be white-boarded, then it suggests that it is not well understood.
If a clear and concise whiteboard diagram can be provided, others will understand it and it will be easier to communicate details. TD is both a web application and a desktop application; refer to the project's GitHub repository for the latest release. The Poirot tool isolates and diagnoses defects through fault modeling and simulation. Along with a carefully selected partitioning strategy, functional and sequential test pattern applications show success with circuits having a high degree of observability.
It is one of the longest lived threat modeling tools, having been introduced as Microsoft SDL in , and is actively supported; version 7. SeaSponge is an accessible web-based threat modeling tool. The tool provides an online live Demo. Define any distinct boundaries External boundaries and Internal boundaries within which a system trusts all sub-systems including data.
Define the interfaces through which potential attackers can interact with the application or supply them with data.
New threat models can be built with substantial time and resource savings when the common features and functionality are draw from a library of templates. Threat model templates enable architects, developers, and security analysts to take commonly used threat models and save them as templates.
They can then be reused, in some cases with minor adaptations, as a foundation for creating new threat models. Leveraging pre-defined templates introduces efficiencies into the threat modeling process and reduces the time and effort required to build new threat models.
The templates can be used to enforce pre-defined architecture and specifications for hardened components. The Threat Modeling Tool team is constantly working to improve tool functionality and experience. A few minor changes might take place over the course of the year, but all major changes require rewrites in the guide. Refer to it often to ensure you get the latest announcements. Ricardo: Hi Cristina, I worked on the threat model diagram and wanted to make sure we got the details right.
Can you help me look it over? Cristina: Absolutely. Ricardo opens the tool and shares his screen with Cristina. Cristina: Ok, looks straightforward, but can you walk me through it? Ricardo: Sure! Here is the breakdown:.
The Threat Modeling Tool allows users to specify trust boundaries, indicated by the red dotted lines, to show where different entities are in control.
For example, IT administrators require an Active Directory system for authentication purposes, so the Active Directory is outside of their control. The idea is that software comes under a predictable set of threats, which can be found using these 6 categories.
This approach is like securing your house by ensuring each door and window has a locking mechanism in place before adding an alarm system or chasing after the thief. The generated threat helps him understand potential design flaws. The description made him realize the importance of adding an authentication mechanism to prevent users from being spoofed, revealing the first threat to be worked on. A few minutes into the discussion with Cristina, they understood the importance of implementing access control and roles.
Ricardo filled in some quick notes to make sure these were implemented. Could not load branches. Could not load tags. Latest commit. Git stats 48 commits. Failed to load latest commit information. Azure Cloud Services.
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